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2018 CHICAGO COUNCIL SURVEY

America Engaged

American Public Opinion and
US Foreign Policy

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the wake of the 2016 US presidential election, political analysts warned of a dark era ahead. Newly elected President Donald Trump had long expressed opposition to US security alliances, skepticism of free trade, and support for authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir Putin.¹ Since the American public generally relies on their political leaders for foreign policy decisions, many policy watchers cautioned that the country was headed for a populist, unilateralist, and protectionist retreat from global leadership.


While the Trump administration has taken action along this path—unilaterally withdrawing from the Paris and Iran agreements, pulling the United States out from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement, and questioning the value of long-time alliances like NATO—the majority of the American public has not followed this lead.

To the contrary, most Americans have moved in the opposite direction. The largest majority since 1974—except for just after the September 11 attacks—now support active US engagement in world affairs. A solid majority supports multilateral diplomacy, underscored by public willingness to accept international decisions that are not the first choice for the United States. A record number of Americans now acknowledge the benefits of international trade. Even though the United States withdrew from both the Paris Agreement and the Iran nuclear deal, public support for these agreements has actually increased. And as the ultimate indicator of commitment to allies, increased majorities express support for sending US troops to defend both NATO and Asian allies if they are attacked.

Americans Want the United States to Remain Engaged

Despite attempts by the White House to pull the United States back from global engagement, seven in 10 Americans (Figure A) favor the United States taking an active part in world affairs (70%). This reading is a 7 percentage point increase from the 2017 Chicago Council Survey and is the highest recorded level of support since 1974 except for 2002, the first Chicago Council Survey conducted after the September 11 attacks.

Figure A: US Role in World Affairs



A Majority Wants Shared Action on Global Issues

The American public does not envision the United States working alone when playing an active role on the world stage. Rather, a striking majority (91%) say that it is more effective for the United States to work with allies and other countries to achieve its foreign policy goals. Just 8 percent say that it is more effective for the United States to tackle world problems on its own.

Sharing leadership on global issues may mean that the United States does not always achieve its preferred policy outcomes. Yet a majority support the United States making decisions with its allies even if it means the United States will sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice (66% agree, 32% disagree). Similarly, two-thirds of Americans believe that the United States should be more willing to make decisions within the United Nations even if it means that the United States will sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice (64% agree, 34% disagree)—the highest level of support on this question since it was first asked in 2004, when 66 percent agreed.

Support Is Up for the Iran Deal and the Paris Agreement


President Trump has broken away from several international agreements since taking office, including the Paris Agreement on climate change and the Iran nuclear deal. But the American public has not followed the president's cues. Majorities of the public say that the United States should participate in the Iran deal (66%) and the Paris Agreement (68%). In fact, support for US participation in both of these high-profile international agreements has risen 6 percentage points over the past year (Figure B).²

Figure B: International Agreements


Based on what you know, do you think the United States should or should not participate in the following international agreements? (% should participate)

■ 2016 ■ 2017 ■ 2018

The Paris Agreement
that calls for countries
to collectively reduce
their emissions of
greenhouse gases
n = 999



The agreement that lifts
some international
economic sanctions
against Iran in exchange
for strict limits on its
nuclear program for at
least the next decade
n = 1,045



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It's More Important to be Admired than Feared

The administration has attempted to change the nature of US influence around the world by using coercive rhetoric toward both allies and hostile actors. Perhaps reflective of this approach, more Americans think that the United States is now more feared (39%) than admired (20%) around the world today, though many volunteer an alternative response, ranging from “a joke” to “weak” to “falling apart.”³ But almost three times as many Americans think admiration (73%) of the United States is more important than fear (26%) of the United States to achieve US foreign policy goals.

As interactions with US allies have strained over the course of the past year, majorities of Americans say that relations with other countries are worsening (56%) and that the United States is losing allies (57%). Just 12 percent of the public says that the United States is gaining allies and 31 percent state there has been no change.


US Public Wants to Maintain or Increase Commitment to NATO

While some administration officials have praised NATO, the president has repeatedly criticized European allies for not spending enough on defense.⁴ Yet his attacks do not seem to have dented public support for the transatlantic alliance. A majority of Americans continue to favor maintaining (57%) or increasing (18%) US commitment to NATO; in fact, a higher percentage of Americans now favor increasing the US commitment to NATO than ever before (Figure C).

Figure C: NATO Commitment

Do you feel we should increase our commitment to NATO, keep our commitment what it is now, decrease our commitment to NATO, or withdraw from NATO entirely? (%)

n = 2,046



2018 Chicago Council Survey

AS INTERACTIONS WITH US ALLIES HAVE STRAINED OVER THE COURSE OF THE PAST YEAR, MAJORITIES OF AMERICANS SAY THAT RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES ARE WORSENING (56%) AND THAT THE UNITED STATES IS LOSING ALLIES (57%).

Support for Using US Troops to Defend Key Allies Has Grown

Americans continue to favor contributing to allies' security through bases and security commitments, and their willingness to do so has increased since last year. Majorities of Americans support maintaining long-term military bases in South Korea (74%) and Japan (65%); both responses are at record levels since the question was first asked in the 2002 Chicago Council Survey. As in past surveys, a majority continue to support maintaining US bases in Germany (60%). Further, two-thirds of Americans support sending US troops to defend South Korea (64%) and Japan (64%) if attacked by North Korea, and 54 percent support defending Baltic NATO allies with US troops if Russia invades. Each of these measures is at a peak since the Council began asking these questions.

Americans Are High on Trade

The White House is waging trade battles on multiple fronts, but the American public is more positive about the benefits of trade than ever before, surpassing even the previous record ratings of 2017 (Figure D). Large majorities of Americans now say that trade is good for consumers like you (85%), the US economy (82%), and creating jobs in the United States (67%).

Figure D: International Trade

Overall, do you think international trade is good or bad for: (% good)
n = 2,046



While the president has criticized the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and withdrawn from the TPP trade agreement, 63 percent of Americans now say NAFTA is good for the US economy, up from 53 percent in 2017, and another record level in Chicago Council surveys. A majority of Americans (61%) also believe the United States should participate in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, or the CPTPP, a trade agreement formed by the 11 signatories to the original TPP after US withdrawal.

Americans face the possibility of serious trade disruptions, as the United States and China are currently exchanging several rounds of tariffs. While only four in 10 Americans consider a possible trade war with China a critical threat (42%), a combined seven in 10 Americans are very (31%) or somewhat (41%) concerned that a trade war with China will hurt their local economy.⁵ Trade disputes with Mexico, America's third-largest trading partner, are somewhat less concerning to the US public: just over half of the public are very (19%) or somewhat (33%) concerned about the impact of a trade war with Mexico on their local economy.⁶

Conclusion

The Trump administration's bold attempts to reshape US foreign policy have not convinced many Americans to join the bandwagon. The past two years have given the American public a glimpse of President Trump's alternative vision for the role of the United States in the world. And while Trump's base continues to share his vision, the majority of Americans do not.

Instead, most Americans are more convinced about the benefits of active US engagement and the need to work with allies. They see US soft power as more effective than muscular intimidation in accomplishing US foreign policy goals and believe the United States is losing allies and world respect. On those specific issues where the White House has taken action—withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal, the Paris Agreement, and the TPP agreement—Americans are less likely to see them as “wins” and more likely to endorse participating in these agreements. On traditional approaches to US foreign policy, including maintaining military bases abroad, defending key allies if attacked, and supporting trade, Americans have doubled down. The bottom line is that two years into the Trump administration, solid majorities of the American public have rejected the “America First” platform. ■

INTRODUCTION

Donald Trump entered the White House intent on reshaping US foreign policy. While some of his cabinet officials adhered to a traditional, rules-based approach to foreign policy, he has argued loudly and frequently that the United States must stop underwriting the security and prosperity of other countries at its own expense.⁷ Further, he has called for the United States to withdraw from key international agreements or renegotiate existing deals and said that any new deals struck under his administration would deliver the lion's share of the benefits to the United States. These views are the essence of his "America First" platform.

President Trump coupled this rhetoric with bold action. He unilaterally withdrew the United States from the Iran agreement that lifted sanctions in exchange for constraints on and inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities. By most accounts, this agreement was working just as it should, but Trump labeled it a "horrible, one-sided deal" in his speech announcing US withdrawal.⁸ He also withdrew the United States from the Paris Agreement on climate change, a nonbinding treaty signed by every other nation on earth, calling it an agreement that "disadvantaged the United States."⁹ Trump pulled the United States out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement, having said the structure of the deal was "terrible."¹⁰ He threatened to pull the United States out of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)—"the worst trade deal maybe ever signed anywhere, but certainly ever signed in this country"—before settling on renegotiating its key terms.¹¹ He chastised NATO allies at the NATO summit in Brussels in July 2018 for not spending enough money on defense. Four days later, he met one-on-one with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Helsinki. There he seemed to accept Putin's denial of Russian interference in the 2016 US elections, against the unanimous conclusion of the US intelligence community.¹² On President Trump's scorecard, each of these moves was a "win" for the United States.


Trump's foreign policy actions over the past two years have given the American public an opportunity to consider a different vision of US foreign policy and the US role in the world. But most Americans do not like what they have seen. While Trump's base has remained supportive of the president's policies, the bulk of the American public rejects the America First platform and opposes many of the specific actions undertaken by the Trump administration.¹³ Instead, the majority of Americans remain committed to the traditional tools of US foreign policy—American global leadership, security alliances, free trade, and multilateralism. ■

MORE ENGAGED IN THE WORLD

Despite the Trump administration's attempts to pull the United States back from global engagement, 70 percent of Americans favor the United States continuing to take an active part in world affairs. Just 29 percent prefer that the United States stay out of world affairs (Figure 1). Support for global engagement has jumped 7 percentage points since the 2017 Chicago Council Survey and is at the highest recorded level since 1974 except for 2002, the first Council Survey conducted after the September 11 attacks.

Figure 1: US Role in World Affairs

Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs? (%)
n = 2,046



Note: Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.

2018 Chicago Council Survey

The most common rationale for those respondents endorsing an active US role in world affairs is that the United States cannot avoid international engagement when the world is so interconnected. "The United States cannot exist in a vacuum. We trade globally. We breathe the air of the entire world, we share oceans with the entire world, we are affected by the climate of the globe," explains one respondent. Another survey participant comments, "We need to be seen as involved in other nations. We need to know what is going on with them in terms of concerns, troubles, wars, diseases, etc.; ultimately it affects us too." Many respondents directly reject an isolationist approach, contending that "we cannot expect to be isolated and yet a part of the world if we do not actively participate" and "isolationism is a fool's gambit...whenever America turns away from the world, the world bites America on the ass."

***History has taught us that isolationism doesn't work.
We are part of the world.***

—59-year-old woman from Ohio

Others focus on the need to remain internationally active so that the United States can influence world events and politics. “Participation means that we are helping shape the events,” remarked one respondent. Another participant comments, by “turning our [America’s] back on our world, we cede our place at the table.”

Many respondents diverge sharply from the president’s transactional approach toward US allies and trading partners. Some argue that “We are dependent for our safety and security on the safety and security of our allies,” and “If we do not know and understand our neighbors, we may stand alone when we might need help.” Others point to US economic security, stating that “strong economic relationships are the backbone of global peace,” and that “being involved with other countries ensures America’s ability to trade effectively.”

Still others emphasize a moral obligation: “As the superpower in the world we are obligated and forced into this position;” and “If we claim to be an exceptional country, we have a moral obligation to help make the world a better place. This cannot be done by isolating ourselves.” And as another respondent remarks, “The United States should be using its resources and capabilities to help other countries when possible.” This viewpoint, too, runs counter to Trump’s America First philosophy. As he stated in his first speech at the UN General Assembly, “As long as I hold office, I will defend America’s interests above all else.”¹⁴

The minority of respondents who think that the United States should stay out of world affairs mirror President Trump’s views that there are downsides to American international engagement. While noting that “America is the world leader,” some disagree with America’s financial involvement in world affairs, stating that “America needs to stop sending everyone else money until we can take care of [Americans].” Others express a desire to avoid interfering in other countries, asserting that “there are issues that don’t concern America” and suggest the United States “stops arming the world.”¹⁵

ADMIRATION OVER FEAR

While the White House has sought to refashion the role of the United States in the world, it has also attempted to change the nature of US global influence to a more coercive style. For example, President Trump threatened North Korea with “fire and fury” and Iran with “CONSEQUENCES THE LIKES OF WHICH FEW THROUGHOUT HISTORY HAVE EVER SUFFERED.”¹⁶ With allies, he has resorted to intimidating rhetoric in trying to compel NATO allies into spending more on defense and has imposed

tariffs against longtime US partners, including Canada, the European Union, Japan, and Mexico. These actions have created concern among both adversaries and allies about US intentions. While Americans acknowledge that maintaining US military superiority around the world is a very effective foreign policy tool, a majority believe it is more important for the United States to be admired (73%) than feared (26%) to achieve US foreign policy goals (Figure 2a).¹⁷

Figure 2a: Is It Better to Be Feared or Admired for US Foreign Policy?

In order to achieve US foreign policy goals internationally, do you think it is more important for the United States to be feared or admired around the world? (%)
n = 1,011





Figure 2b: And Is the United States Feared or Admired?

And today, do you think the United States is more feared or more admired around the world? (%)
n = 1,011



Note: Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.

2018 Chicago Council Survey

But when asked whether the United States is more admired or feared around the world today, just 20 percent of Americans say that the country is admired, compared with 39 percent who state the country is more feared (Figure 2b). Moreover, this question elicits a striking number of volunteered responses. Forty percent choose “other,” and when asked to specify, the most common responses are along the lines that the United States is laughed at, a joke, or ridiculed (13%). Others volunteer that the United States is neither feared nor admired (5%), is disliked and hated (4%), is both feared and admired (3%), or is weak and falling apart (2%). For this state of affairs, some respondents blame the president, saying that “we’re becoming a joke thanks to Trump.” But others place the blame on the previous administration, arguing that “our image is still recovering from the damage done by Obama.” And some lay blame on both sides: “Obama made his ‘red line’ over and over and Trump hasn’t really been tested but people think he’s a joke.”

Shared Action on Global Issues

The American public does not envision the United States acting alone when participating in world affairs. Instead, a striking majority (91%) say that it is more effective for the United States to work with allies and other countries to achieve its foreign policy goals. In contrast, just 8 percent of respondents say it is more effective for the United States to tackle world problems on its own. Similarly, the 2017 Chicago Council Survey found that a majority of Americans prefer that the United States play a shared leadership role in the world (61%), with only a minority saying the United States should be the dominant world leader (32%).

Although Americans clearly want to be involved in world affairs, some find appeal in President Trump’s ideas that the United States should pull back so that allies will step up and do more. Fifty percent of the US public believes that other countries will be forced to do more if the United States does less. But the other half of respondents (49%) say that other countries will take action against world problems only if the United States takes the lead.

INCREASED SUPPORT FOR IRAN AND PARIS AGREEMENTS

As a candidate, Donald Trump promised that he would extricate the United States from a range of deals that he considered disadvantageous to the country.¹⁸ True to his word, in August 2017 his administration withdrew the United States from the Paris Agreement—an agreement that Trump called “unfair at the highest level to the United States.”¹⁹ And in May 2018 the United States withdrew from the Iran nuclear agreement, which the president described as “a horrible one-sided deal that should have never, ever been made.”²⁰ These decisions were made unilaterally, despite partners and allies—and even some top administration officials—urging the White House to stick with these multilateral arrangements.²¹ As commentators noted, both withdrawals reversed major accomplishments of the Obama administration and fulfilled Trump campaign pledges.²²

But most Americans disagree with these moves. A strong majority (68%) of the American public says that the United States should participate in the Paris Agreement that calls for countries to collectively reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases. And two-thirds (66%) also support US participation in the agreement that lifts some international economic sanctions against Iran in exchange for strict limits on its nuclear program for at least the next decade (Figure 3).²³ In fact, support for participating in both of these high-profile international agreements has risen 6 percentage points over the past year.

Figure 3: International Agreements

Based on what you know, do you think the United States should or should not participate in the following international agreements? (% should participate)

■ 2016 ■ 2017 ■ 2018




2018 Chicago Council Survey

MULTILATERALISM, NOT UNILATERALISM

President Trump has shown little inclination to work with allies or the United Nations, as evidenced by his withdrawal of the United States from internationally negotiated agreements and his attempts to cut funding for UN programs.²⁴ In contrast, most Americans favor cooperating with other countries, even if the United States does not always achieve its preferred policy outcomes. A majority (66%) agree that the United States should be more willing to make decisions with its allies even if it means the United States will sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice (32% disagree). Similarly, two-thirds of Americans (64%) agree that the United States should be more willing to make decisions within the United Nations even if it means that the United States will sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice (Figure 4).²⁵

Figure 4: Working Through the United Nations

When dealing with international problems, the United States should be more willing to make decisions within the United Nations even if this means that the United States will sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice. (%)
n = 1,008



Note: Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.

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Allies and Global Influence Matter

Over the past year, President Trump has publicly chastised allies and partners, often with hostile rhetoric. Trump claimed “the people of Germany are turning against their leadership” in response to Angela Merkel’s refugee policy; called Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau “very dishonest and weak”; and while visiting the United Kingdom in July 2018 criticized Prime Minister Theresa May’s handling of Brexit, telling *The Sun* that he had told the prime minister how to handle it and that she had gone “the opposite way.”²⁶ He accused South Korean President Moon Jae-in of appeasement for seeking to improve relations with North Korea.²⁷ And he called the European Union a “foe” in the lead-up to his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin.²⁸

These slights have not gone unnoticed. As interactions with allies have strained over the past year, majorities of Americans say that relations with other countries are worsening (56%) and that the United States is losing allies (57%).²⁹ In addition, 59 percent of Americans say that the United States is less respected now than it was 10 years ago, with 21 percent saying it is more respected now.³⁰

I think the world is laughing at us.

—70-year-old woman from Florida

Americans believe that the international image of the United States matters. For example, six in 10 Americans (57%) say that respect for the United States matters a great deal for American leaders in trying to achieve US foreign policy goals, and an additional three in 10 (31%) say it matters a fair amount.

The public's perception that the United States is losing allies is tied to the view that the United States is losing global influence.³¹ While American views of US influence have remained steady over the past year (8.3 average overall on a scale from 0 to 10), there is a large difference between those who say the United States is losing allies (8.2 influence on average) compared with gaining allies (8.9 on average). Americans are still more confident in their own country than in any other nation: a February/March 2018 survey by the Chicago Council found 68 percent of the public have a great deal or a fair amount of confidence in the United States to deal with world problems responsibly.³²

SIDEBAR

AMERICANS DON'T SHARE TRUMP'S PRAISE OF AUTOCRATS

President Trump has insulted leaders from allied nations, but he has been complimentary and respectful of Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, and other authoritarian leaders.³³

While the US government has imposed punitive measures against Russia, including several rounds of sanctions, President Trump has repeatedly praised Putin and said he wants to have good relations with Russia.³⁴ But Americans have not warmed up to Russia, despite President Trump's outreach to Putin. Fewer than one-quarter of respondents are confident in Russia's ability to deal responsibly with world problems (24% a great deal or fair amount).³⁵ And Putin himself is very unpopular among the US public (14% favorable, 83% unfavorable). Further, Americans were not particularly impressed with the recent tête-a-tête in Helsinki: a Quinnipiac poll shows that more Americans thought that the Helsinki summit was a success for Russia than for the United States.³⁶

Despite the ongoing trade disputes between China and the United States, President Trump has remained optimistic about his relationship with President Xi Jinping. In early April 2018, Trump


tweeted that he and Xi would always be friends.³⁷ But attitudes toward Xi among the American public have remained largely negative. Just one-third have a favorable view of Xi (34% compared with 61% unfavorable), unchanged since 2017. Even so, public attitudes toward China do not seem to be closely tied to perceptions of its leader. In a February/March 2018 survey, Americans rated China an average of 45 degrees on a feeling thermometer scale, where 0 represents a very cold, unfavorable feeling and 100 represents a very warm, favorable feeling.³⁸

Similarly, despite Trump's praise for North Korean leader Kim Jong Un after the Singapore summit, Kim's image among Americans remains deeply negative (6% favorable, 91% unfavorable). According to a CBS News poll, a plurality of Americans (47%) think the summit produced mixed results for the United States; just one-third think it was a success (32%).³⁹ While Americans are less likely to sense a critical threat from North Korea's nuclear program now (59%) than in 2017 (75%), it is still the top-rated threat after international terrorism (see Appendix Figure 1).

When asked about the global influence of other nations around the world, Americans are clearly aware of a rising China. They see China as the second-most influential country in the world (7.3), up slightly from 2017, followed by the European Union (6.8) and Russia (6.6) (See Figure 5.) While American views of Russian influence have also risen slightly, perceptions of European influence have, on average, remained stable since 2002 despite significant shifts in both directions each year. Over the past decade, American impressions of Japanese influence have declined somewhat, falling from an average of 6.4 in 2010 to 5.7 in 2018. Meanwhile, views of South Korean influence have remained steady.

Figure 5: Global Influence

I would like to know how much influence you think each of the following countries has in the world. Please answer on a 0 to 10 scale, with 0 meaning they are not at all influential and 10 meaning they are extremely influential. (mean score)
n = 2,046



The United States should be using its resources and capabilities to help other countries when possible.

—38-year-old man from Florida


COMMITTED TO ALLIANCES

Perhaps because of a sense that the United States is losing allies around the world, the US public now underscores the value of US alliances and partnerships in East Asia and Europe. In 2017, Chicago Council Survey results showed that Americans believed security alliances in Europe and East Asia benefited both the United States and its allies. Now, in 2018, Americans are reaffirming those commitments.⁴⁰

While some Trump administration officials have praised NATO, the president has repeatedly criticized NATO allies for not spending enough on defense; at one point Trump reportedly threatened to withdraw from the alliance.⁴¹ But the president's attacks have done little to deter public support for NATO. A majority of Americans continue to favor maintaining (57%) or increasing (18%) the US commitment to NATO (Figure 6), as they have since the Council began asking this question in 1974. In fact, the 18 percent of Americans who want to increase the US commitment to NATO is the highest level ever recorded in Chicago Council Surveys. In contrast, 16 percent want to decrease the US commitment, and just 6 percent want to withdraw entirely.

Figure 6: **NATO Commitment**

Do you feel we should increase our commitment to NATO, keep our commitment what it is now, decrease our commitment to NATO, or withdraw from NATO entirely? (%)
n = 2,046



2018 Chicago Council Survey


US relationships with Asian allies have also been strained in the past several years, including during the Obama administration.⁴² More recently, America's South Korean and Japanese allies have watched the Trump administration swing from discussions of preemptive strikes on North Korea to a historic summit between North Korean and American leaders.⁴³ Economic tensions have added additional levels of concern, with Korean and Japanese businesses facing new tariff barriers to US markets.

Despite these tensions, the American public's affinity for Asian allies has strengthened. Long friendly toward Japan and South Korea, Americans have warmed even further over the first two years of the Trump administration. Majorities of Americans are also confident in their Japanese (62%) and South Korean (50%) allies to handle world problems responsibly, and large majorities consider Japan (86%) and South Korea (78%) partners to the United States while few see them as rivals. In contrast, the US public is more divided on its view of China (49% rival, 50% partner).⁴⁴

While Americans do see China as important to the US economy (92%) and for US security (85%), two-thirds of Americans (66%) think the United States should prioritize building up strong relations with Japan and South Korea even if it diminishes US relations with China (Figure 7). About one-quarter think the United States should put a higher priority on building a new partnership with China (26%). Support for prioritizing US relationships with Asian allies has risen steadily since 2012, following the announcement of a new US pivot to Asia.⁴⁵ Since then, Americans have increasingly preferred to build strong relationships with their Korean and Japanese allies.

Figure 7: US Policy in Asia

Now thinking about US foreign policy in Asia, do you think the United States should put a higher priority on: (%)
 n = 1,011



2018 Chicago Council Survey


SIDEBAR CHINA IS NOT SEEN AS A CRITICAL THREAT

While Americans prefer developing ties with other Asian allies over ties with China, it is not because they see China as a critical threat. In contrast to the official US government view that China is a strategic competitor—as stated in the 2017 National Security Strategy—this characterization has not taken hold among the public.⁴⁶ Just 39 percent of Americans consider the development of China as a world power a critical threat

facing the United States. This makes it one of the lowest-ranked threats included in this year’s survey and is largely unchanged since 2006. Additionally, a separate February-March 2018 Chicago Council survey found that few Americans felt that the development of Chinese economic (31%) or military (39%) power poses a critical threat to the United States.⁴⁷

Figure: Threat of China

Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all: **The development of China as a world power** (% critical threat)
n = 2,046




2018 Chicago Council Survey

TWO-THIRDS OF AMERICANS (66%) THINK THE UNITED STATES SHOULD PRIORITIZE BUILDING UP STRONG RELATIONS WITH JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA EVEN IF IT DIMINISHES US RELATIONS WITH CHINA.

US Support for Allies

While President Trump has at times said he would like to reduce the overseas presence of US troops, growing majorities of Americans support long-term military bases in a number of allied nations.⁴⁸ Three in four (74%) support maintaining US bases in South Korea, and two-thirds (65%) support bases in Japan—both all-time high levels of support since the Council began asking the question in 2002 (Figure 8).



In Europe, a majority of Americans (60%) continue to favor US bases in Germany, as they have for nearly two decades. Support for US bases elsewhere has also risen sharply in recent years, including in Poland (47%, up from 37% in 2014, when first asked) and Turkey (53%, up from 43% in 2014).

Large majorities of Americans support using US troops to defend allies, including generic scenarios where a US ally is invaded (85% favor) and if another country seizes territory of a US ally (73% favor). (See Appendix Figure 4.) Moreover, support for defending US allies in specific cases has risen notably in recent years.


For example, 64 percent of Americans now favor using US troops to defend South Korea. This is a sharp rise from 2015, when Americans were divided, with 47 percent of Americans supporting and 49 percent opposing the use of US troops to defend South Korea from a North Korean invasion. Two-thirds (64%) of Americans also support using US troops to defend Japan against an attack from North Korea. This stance, too, is a dramatic change from 2015, when Americans were more hesitant to commit US troops to the defense of Japan (48% favored, 47% opposed). (See Appendix Figure 3.)

Similar shifts have occurred with US public support for the defense of NATO allies. Today, 54 percent are in favor of using US troops if Russia were to invade a NATO ally like Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania, while 42 percent oppose (Figure 9). This is a new high since the Council began asking this question in 2014 and a significant change from 2015, when only 45 percent of Americans supported defending these same Baltic allies with US troops (51% opposed).

Figure 9: Use of US Troops

There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using US troops in other parts of the world. Please give your opinion about some situations. Would you favor or oppose the use of US troops: (% favor)

n = 1,051



In contrast, Americans are reluctant to enter into a conflict with China. Minorities of Americans support the use of US troops if China initiates a conflict with Japan over disputed islands or if China invades Taiwan. Yet support for US involvement in both conflicts has risen since 2015. One in three Americans (35%) favors using US troops if China invades Taiwan, up from 28 percent in 2015 and an all-time high level of support for US involvement since the question was first asked in 1998. Similarly, current support for deploying US troops in the event of a Chinese-initiated conflict with Japan over disputed islands (41%) is up 8 percentage points since 2015, when the question was first asked.

HIGH ON TRADE

In 2018, trade became an issue of serious public debate as President Trump enacted his more skeptical approach to trade deals through tariffs imposed on allies and competitors alike. These tariffs, according to the Trump administration, will rebalance trade in America's favor after years of other countries taking advantage of the United States. Most economists, however, believe tariffs are counterproductive: in the March 2018 IGM Economic Experts Panel survey, the panel uniformly agreed that imposing new US tariffs on steel and aluminum would not improve Americans' welfare.⁴⁹ And polls show that American opinion on the tariffs imposed by the Trump administration is divided at best.⁵⁰

Today, the American public is more optimistic about the benefits of trade than ever before, surpassing even the previous highs of 2017. Large majorities of Americans (Figure 10) say that trade is good for consumers like you (85%), the US economy (82%), and creating jobs in the United States (67%).⁵¹

Along with increasingly positive views of the benefits of international trade over the past two years, support for specific trade deals has increased as well.

Figure 10: International Trade

Overall, do you think international trade is good or bad for: (% good)
n = 2,046



2018 Chicago Council Survey

Strong economic relationships are the backbone of global peace.

—41-year-old woman from Georgia

Trump campaigned strongly against the TPP agreement, which was championed by President Obama, and withdrew the United States from TPP negotiations upon taking office. The 2018 survey results, however, show that a majority (61%) of Americans supports US participation in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), a trade agreement among 11 Pacific nations formed by the signatories to the original TPP (without the United States).⁵² American support for this type of trade agreement is consistent with past Chicago Council Survey results; when previously asked about the TPP in the 2016 Chicago Council Survey, 60 percent of Americans favored US participation.


Meanwhile, NAFTA has been under continued renegotiation and even existential threat during Trump's presidency; as the president has said, "the way you're going to make the best deal is to terminate NAFTA."⁵³ But the 2018 survey results, conducted before the United States and Mexico announced a breakthrough in the negotiations, show that 63 percent of Americans now say NAFTA is good for the US economy (Figure 11), an all-time high and an increase of 10 percentage points from 2017, when a narrow majority (53%) said the same.

Figure 11: Views of NAFTA

Overall, do you think the North American Free Trade Agreement, also known as NAFTA, is good or bad for the US economy? (%)

n = 2,064

— Good — Bad



Concerned about Trade War with China

The Trump administration has made the US trade deficit a key focus of its trade policy.⁵⁴ President Trump has repeatedly claimed that "we lose \$800 billion a year on trade, every year," an assertion that one trade economist said "defies the most basic of economics."⁵⁵ Despite the volume of discussion about the US trade deficit in recent years, it remains a low priority for most Americans. Only four in 10 (42%) name reducing the trade deficit a very important goal for US foreign policy.


However, Americans are currently confronted with the possibility of serious trade disruptions, with the United States and China currently imposing ever-greater tariffs on one another. While only four in 10 Americans name a possible trade war with China as a critical threat, a combined seven in 10 are very

(31%) or somewhat (41%) concerned that a trade war with China—the United States' largest trading partner—will hurt their local economy (Figure 12).⁵⁶ Trade disputes with Mexico, the United States' third-largest trading partner, are somewhat less concerning to the US public: half are very (19%) or somewhat (33%) concerned about the impact a trade war with Mexico would have on their local economy.⁵⁷

Figure 12: Trade Wars

If the United States gets into a trade war with (China/Mexico), how concerned are you that this would hurt the local economy in your area? (%)

■ Very concerned ■ Somewhat concerned ■ Not very concerned ■ Not concerned at all



Note: Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.

2018 Chicago Council Survey

CONCLUSION

President Trump has presented the American public with a new vision of the United States and its role in the world. This vision places primacy on short-term US interests, discounts US allies and their importance to the United States, and eschews multilateral frameworks. However, this perspective has been greeted with limited enthusiasm among the American public. In fact, the survey results demonstrate that most Americans have rejected that vision and are moving in the opposite direction.


Support for the Paris Agreement on climate change and the nuclear agreement with Iran have increased. Americans increasingly value close alliances with Japan and South Korea and remain committed to NATO. A greater majority of Americans now than ever before would favor sending US troops to defend key allies if they are attacked. Support has also increased for the States' working with allies and through the United Nations even if it means sacrificing preferred policy outcomes for the United States. And the benefits of free trade are more recognized now than at any time in the past.

A US foreign policy that pursues a nationalist agenda without regard for the interests of its partners and allies is not a foreign policy that is supported by the majority of Americans. The public has shown that it prefers an American foreign policy that supports free trade, values its allies, and works within the international system. ■

APPENDIX

Appendix Figure 1: Threats to the United States

Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all: (% critical threat)
n = 2,046




2018 Chicago Council Survey

Appendix Figure 2: US Foreign Policy Goals

Below is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. For each one please select whether you think that it should be a very important foreign policy goal of the United States, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all: (% very important goal)

n = 2,046




2018 Chicago Council Survey

Appendix Figure 3: Use of US Troops Abroad in Specific Scenarios

There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using US troops in other parts of the world. Please give your opinion about some situations. Would you favor or oppose the use of US troops: (% favor)

n = 1,051




2018 Chicago Council Survey

Appendix Figure 4: Use of US Troops Abroad in General Scenarios

There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using US troops in other parts of the world. Please give your opinion about some situations. Would you favor or oppose the use of US troops: (% favor)

n = 995



2018 Chicago Council Survey

METHODOLOGY

This report is based on the results of a survey commissioned by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. The 2018 Chicago Council Survey, a project of the Lester Crown Center on US Foreign Policy, is the latest effort in a series of wide-ranging surveys on American attitudes toward US foreign policy. The 2018 Chicago Council Survey is made possible by the generous support of the Crown family, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the US-Japan Foundation, the Korea Foundation, and the Robert R. McCormick Foundation. Special thanks to the team at Leff Communications for professional editing, design, and layout.

The survey was conducted from July 12 to 31, 2018, among a representative national sample of 2,046 adults. The margin of sampling error for the full sample is ± 2.37 , including a design effect of 1.1954. The margin of error is higher for partisan subgroups or for partial-sample items.

Partisan identification is based on respondents' answers to a standard partisan self-identification question: "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?"

A full listing of questions asked in the 2018 Chicago Council Survey, including details on which questions were administered to split samples, is available online at www.thechicagocouncil.org.

The survey was conducted by GfK Custom Research, a polling, social science, and market research firm in Palo Alto, California, using a randomly selected sample of GfK's large-scale nationwide research panel, KnowledgePanel® (KP). The survey was fielded to a total of 3,520 panel members yielding a total of 2,200 completed surveys (a completion rate of 62.5%). The median survey length was 22 minutes. Of the 2,200 total completed surveys, 154 cases were excluded for quality control reasons, leaving a final sample size of 2,046 respondents:

Respondents were excluded if they failed at least one of three key checks:

- Respondents who completed the survey in eight minutes or less.
- Respondents who refused to answer half or more of the items in the survey.
- Respondents who failed two or three of the following checks:
 - Refused or skipped the question that was specifically designed to make sure respondents were paying attention. ("In order to make sure that your browser is working correctly, please select number 4 from the list below.")
 - Refused one or more full lists that included five items or more (there were 17 such lists).
 - Respondents who gave exactly the same answer ("straight-lined") to every item on one of four grid questions in the survey (Q5, Q7, Q44, or Q130).

The GfK Knowledge Panel (KP) was originally based exclusively on a national Random Digit Dialing (RDD) sampling methodology. To improve the representation of the panel, GfK migrated to using an Address-Based Sampling (ABS) methodology via the Delivery Sequence File (DSF) of the USPS for recruiting panel members in 2009. This probability-based sampling methodology improves population coverage and provides a more effective sampling infrastructure for recruitment of hard-to-reach

individuals, such as young adults and those from various minority groups. It should be noted that under the ABS recruitment, households without an internet connection are provided with a web-enabled device and free internet service. Thus, the sample is not limited to those in the population who already have internet access.

In general, the specific survey samples represent an equal probability selection method (EPSEM) sample from the panel for general population surveys. The raw distribution of KP mirrors that of the US adults fairly closely, barring occasional disparities that may emerge for certain subgroups due to differential attrition.

To ensure selection of general population samples from KP behave as EPSEM, additional measures are undertaken, starting by weighting the pool of active members to the geodemographic benchmarks secured from the latest March supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS) along several dimensions. Using the resulting weights as measure of size, in the next step a PPS (probability proportional to size) procedure is used to select study specific samples. It is the application of this PPS methodology with the imposed size measures that produces fully self-weighting samples from KP, for which each sample member can carry a design weight of unity. Moreover, in instances where a study design requires any form of oversampling of certain subgroups, such departures from an EPSEM design are accounted for by adjusting the design weights in reference to the CPS benchmarks for the population of interest.

The geodemographic benchmarks used to weight the active panel members for computation of size measures include:

- Gender (male, female)
- Age (18–29, 30–44, 45–59, 60 or older)
- Race/Hispanic ethnicity (white non-Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, other non-Hispanic, two-plus races non-Hispanic, Hispanic)
- Education (less than high school, high school, some college, bachelor's degree or higher)
- Census region (Northeast, Midwest, South, West)
- Household income (less than \$10,000, \$10,000–\$24,999, \$25,000–\$49,999, \$50,000–\$74,999, \$75,000–\$99,999, \$100,000–\$149,999, \$150,000 or more)
- Home ownership status (own, rent/other)
- Metropolitan area (yes, no)

Once the study sample has been selected and the survey administered, the survey administered, and all the survey data edited and made final, design weights are adjusted to account for any differential nonresponse that may have resulted during the field period. Depending on the specific target population for a given study, geodemographic distributions for the corresponding population are obtained from the CPS, the American Community Survey (ACS), or in certain instances from the weighted KP profile data. For this purpose, an iterative proportional fitting (raking) procedure is used to produce the final weights. In the final step, calculated weights are examined to identify and, if necessary, trim outliers at the extreme upper and lower tails of the weight distribution. The resulting weights are then scaled to aggregate to the total sample size of all eligible respondents.


For this study, the following benchmark distributions of the US adult general population (age 18 or older) from the most recent data (March 2017 Supplement) from the Current Population Survey (CPS) were used for the raking adjustment of weights:

- Gender (male, female) by age (18–29, 30–44, 45–59, 60 or older)
- Race/Hispanic ethnicity (white non-Hispanic, black, non-Hispanic, other, Non-Hispanic, two or more races non-Hispanic, Hispanic)
- Census region (Northeast, Midwest, South, West) by metropolitan status (metro, nonmetro)
- Education (high school or less, some college, bachelor's degree or higher)
- Household income (less than \$25,000, \$25,000–\$49,999; \$50,000–\$74,999, \$75,000–\$99,999, \$100,000–\$149,999, \$150,000 or more)

For more information about the sample and survey methodology, please visit the GfK website at www.gfk.com.

For more information about the Chicago Council Survey, please contact Craig Kafura, research associate, at ckafura@thechicagocouncil.org.

ABOUT THE SURVEY SAMPLE



2018 Chicago Council Survey

ABOUT THE CHICAGO COUNCIL SURVEY

The Chicago Council Survey, conducted every four years since 1974, biennially since 2002, and annually since 2014, is a trusted and widely cited source of longitudinal data on American public opinion about a broad range of US foreign policy and international issues. Since its inception, the survey has captured the sense of particular eras—post-Vietnam, post-Cold War, post-9/11—and identified critical shifts in American public thinking. With its combination of time series and comprehensive coverage, the Chicago Council Survey is a valuable resource to policymakers, academics, media, and the general public. The Chicago Council Surveys are highly respected and widely used in policy circles and academic research both in the United States and abroad. Several scholarly works have drawn on Chicago Council survey data, including *The Foreign Policy Disconnect* (Page, Bouton), *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy* (Holsti), *Faces of Internationalism* (Wittkopf), and *The Rational Public* (Page, Shapiro). All of the Chicago Council Survey data sets are available to the public via the Roper Center and the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, and the 2018 data will soon be available on www.thechicagocouncil.org.

In addition to the annual Chicago Council Survey of American public opinion and US foreign policy, the Council's polling has often expanded to international polling in Asia, Europe, Mexico, and Russia. In fact, the Council was awarded a two-year grant from the Carnegie Corporation to conduct public and elite opinion surveys in partnership with the Levada Analytical Center in Moscow. The Council has also reintroduced a leaders' survey as an important component of the 2014, 2016, and 2018 Chicago Council Surveys. Besides these comprehensive reports, the Chicago Council Survey team publishes and disseminates short opinion briefs on topical issues such as international trade, immigration, North Korea's nuclear program, and Iran. These short reports can be found on the Council's website and on the Chicago Council Survey blog www.thechicagocouncil.org/RunningNumbers.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ For example, see Thomas Wright, “The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Crisis of US Foreign Policy,” *Lowy Institute*, October 10, 2016, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/2016-presidential-campaign-and-crisis-us-foreign-policy>; see also Daniel L. Byman et al., “Experts Weigh In: What this Election Means for US Foreign Policy and Next Steps,” *Brookings: Order from Chaos*, November 9, 2016, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/11/09/experts-weigh-in-what-this-election-means-for-u-s-foreign-policy-and-next-steps/>.
- ² Most items in the 2018 Chicago Council Survey were fielded to the full sample of 2,046 respondents. Some questions were asked to partial samples; these are noted throughout in figures.
- ³ This question elicits a striking number of volunteered responses. Forty percent choose “other,” and when asked to specify, common responses include that the United States is laughed at, a joke, or ridiculed (13%), is neither feared nor admired (5%), is disliked/hated (4%), is both feared and admired (3%), and is weak/falling apart (2%).
- ⁴ Amanda Macias and John W. Schoen, “Trump Pushes NATO Allies to Increase Spending as US Funding Slows,” *CNBC*, July 10, 2018, <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/10/trump-pushes-nato-allies-to-increase-spending-as-us-funding-slows.html>.
- ⁵ This puts a trade war with China well below more pressing national security concerns such as international terrorism (66% critical threat) and North Korea’s nuclear program (59% critical threat). See Appendix Figure 1 for full results.
- ⁶ Dina Smeltz and Craig Kafura, “Record Number of Americans Endorse Benefits of Trade,” *Chicago Council on Global Affairs*, August 27, 2018, <https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/publication/record-number-americans-endorse-benefits-trade>.
- ⁷ Josh Rogin, “Trump’s New Foreign Policy Team is Looking a lot More Republican,” *Washington Post*, April 12, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/trumps-foreign-policy-is-about-to-get-a-lot-more-republican/2018/04/12/4af5f37c-3e95-11e8-8d53-eba0ed2371cc_story.html?utm_term=.cd5d0f4d76a9.
- ⁸ “Read the Full Transcript of Trump’s Speech on the Iran Nuclear Deal,” *New York Times*, May 8, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/us/politics/trump-speech-iran-deal.html>.
- ⁹ “Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord,” June 1, 2017, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord/>.
- ¹⁰ Adam Taylor, “A Timeline of Trump’s Complicated Relationship with the TPP,” *Washington Post*, April 13, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/04/13/a-timeline-of-trumps-complicated-relationship-with-the-tpp/?utm_term=.50fbf3b61d9a.
- ¹¹ Patrick Gillespie, “Trump Hammers America’s ‘Worst Trade Deal,’” *CNN Money*, September 27, 2016, <https://money.cnn.com/2016/09/27/news/economy/donald-trump-nafta-hillary-clinton-debate/>.
- ¹² Ron Elving, “Trump’s Helsinki Bow to Putin Leaves World Wondering: Why?” *NPR*, July 17, 2018, <https://www.npr.org/2018/07/17/629601233/trumps-helsinki-bow-to-putin-leaves-world-wondering-whats-up>.
- ¹³ For a detailed look at the views of these core Trump supporters, see Dina Smeltz et al., “What Americans Think about America First,” *Chicago Council on Global Affairs*, October 2, 2017, https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/ccgasurvey2017_what_americans_think_about_america_first.pdf.
- ¹⁴ Donald Trump, “Remarks by President Trump to the 72nd Session of the UN General Assembly,” speech, New York, NY, September 19, 2017, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-72nd-session-united-nations-general-assembly/>.
- ¹⁵ Although they answered the question, some participants commented that their position is actually in between the two response options of “active part” and “staying out” of world affairs. For example, “We cannot be divorced from world affairs, but we too frequently have gotten too deeply involved... We ought never to have been involved in Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance. And with the global economy becoming a fact, we must be friends with our trading partners ...”
- ¹⁶ On North Korea, see: Noah Bierman, “Trump Warns North Korea for ‘Fire and Fury,’” *Los Angeles Times*, August 8, 2017; on threats made toward Iran, see, Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), To Iranian President Rouhani: NEVER, EVER THREATEN THE UNITED STATES AGAIN OR YOU WILL SUFFER CONSEQUENCES THE LIKES OF WHICH FEW THROUGHOUT HISTORY HAVE EVER SUFFERED BEFORE. WE ARE NO LONGER A COUNTRY THAT WILL STAND FOR YOUR DEMENTED WORDS OF VIOLENCE & DEATH. BE CAUTIOUS!, July 22, 2018, 8:24 p.m., <https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1021234525626609666>.

- ¹⁷ In 2017, 47 percent of Americans said that maintaining US military superiority was a very effective approach to achieving US foreign policy goals. This response trailed only maintaining existing alliances (49% very effective). For more, see Smeltz et al., “What Americans Think about America First.” Note: In 2018, 51 percent of Americans say that maintaining a super military worldwide is a very important foreign policy goal for the United States. This level is the lowest reading since 2004, when it was 50 percent. See Appendix Figure 2 for full results.
- ¹⁸ Howard Stoffer, “What Trump’s ‘America First’ Policy Could Mean for the World,” *Time*, November 14, 2016, <http://time.com/4569845/donald-trump-america-first/>.
- ¹⁹ Timothy Cama and Devin Henry, “Trump: We Are Getting Out of Paris Climate Deal,” *The Hill*, June 1, 2017, <http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/335955-trump-pulls-us-out-of-paris-climate-deal>.
- ²⁰ Mark Landler, “Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned,” *New York Times*, May 8, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html>.
- ²¹ Jade Scipioni, “Pruitt vs. Tillerson: Trump’s Team Split on Paris Agreement,” *FoxBusiness*, April 18, 2017, <https://www.foxbusiness.com/features/pruitt-vs-tillerson-trumps-team-split-on-paris-agreement>; Ellen Mitchell, “Matti Defends Iran Deal as Trump Considers Withdrawal,” *The Hill*, April 26, 2018, <http://thehill.com/policy/defense/385094-matti-defends-iran-deal-as-trump-considers-withdrawal>.
- ²² Anthony Zurcher, “Three Reasons Behind Trump Ditching Iran Deal,” *BBC News*, May 8, 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-43902372>.
- ²³ The terms described in the wording of this question reflect the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, signed by President Obama in 2015.
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Additional reports based on surveys conducted by the Chicago Council are available at www.thechicagocouncil.org:

“Record Number of Americans Endorse Benefits of Trade,” Dina Smeltz and Craig Kafura, August 27, 2018.

“The Clash of Generations? Intergenerational Change and American Foreign Policy Views,” Trevor Thrall, Dina Smeltz, Erik Goepner, Will Ruger, and Craig Kafura, June 25, 2018.

“US-Russia Experts Paint a Dim Picture of Bilateral Relations Before Summit,” Dina Smeltz, Lily Wojtowicz, Denis Volkov, and Stepan Goncharov, July 12, 2018.

“American Support for US Strikes against Syria Split along Partisan Lines,” Dina Smeltz and Lily Wojtowicz, May 9, 2018.

“American Views toward US-Japan Relations and Asia-Pacific Security,” Karl Friedhoff and Craig Kafura, April 17, 2018.


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