

# A Cost of Conflict

## Americans Turn Inward

**Results of the 2023 Chicago Council  
Survey of American Public Opinion  
and US Foreign Policy**

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# About the Council

Founded in 1922, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to increasing knowledge and engagement in global affairs. Our in-depth analysis and expert-led research influence policy conversations and inform the insights we share with our growing community. Through accessible content and open dialogue of diverse, fact-based perspectives, we empower more people to help shape our global future.

## About the Lester Crown Center on US Foreign Policy

We believe the public plays a critical role in determining the direction of US foreign policy and that an informed and engaged public is critical for effective policymaking. We aim to influence discourse and decisions on important US foreign policy and national security issues by researching public opinion and producing original policy analysis.

## About the Chicago Council Survey

The Chicago Council Survey provides the most comprehensive view of American public opinion on critical US foreign policy issues, highlighting critical trends and shifts in thinking over time since 1974. The Council's polling experts, their annual report, and related topical briefs compose the Council's most recognized area of research. A signature area of study under the Lester Crown Center on US Foreign Policy, the Chicago Council Survey provides the public with a mechanism for sharing views with politicians and decision makers who each year cite the survey as a valuable resource for influencing policy debates.

# Introduction

Over the past five years, there have been growing concerns about the support of the American public for the overseas commitments of the United States. Those concerns have often been unfounded. But in 2023, the ongoing conflicts around the world appear to be eroding support of the American public for the broad participation of the United States in world affairs. Even before the October 7 Hamas attack against Israel and Israel’s subsequent retaliatory war in Gaza, the 2023 Chicago Council Survey—conducted in September 2023—found Americans were beginning to feel the toll of US commitments overseas.

In particular, the survey results suggest that continuing US support for Ukraine following Russia’s invasion has affected American attitudes on foreign policy more broadly. As public support for continuing financial and military assistance to Kyiv has declined, so too has support for defending US allies and maintaining US military bases abroad. This pullback has been especially sharp among supporters of the Republican Party. For years, Republican leadership aligned with former President Donald Trump has espoused an “America-First” ideology on foreign policy and this seems to have influenced GOP supporters’ ideas of how much the United States should participate on the global stage.

The 2024 presidential campaign will highlight just how far the two major political parties in the United States have diverged on foreign policy. The Republican outlook on the US role in the world has consolidated since 2016 and 2020, and GOP leaders continue to call for a more limited role for the United States in the world. Meanwhile, Democratic leaders view the United States as the indispensable nation even as global challenges grow. The 2023 survey results show that both parties will be playing to their bases.

# Key Findings

- A slim majority of the American public (53%) say US military aid to Ukraine has been worth the cost, while 45 percent say it has not. Democrats are strongly convinced the assistance has been worth it (69%), Independents are closely divided (51% worth it, 47% not), and six in 10 Republicans (61%) believe it has not been worth the cost.
- Six in 10 Americans support the provision of economic assistance to Ukraine (61%) and sending additional arms and military supplies to the Ukrainian government (63%), down from 2022 levels. About half of Republicans continue to support sending more financial (47%) and military aid (50%) to Ukraine. While three-quarters of Democrats and six in 10 Independents remain supportive of both forms of aid, these numbers are also down.
- Solid majorities of Democrats (80%) and Independents (63%) are convinced that US security alliances in Europe are beneficial to both the United States and European allies or mostly benefit the United States. Just half of Republicans (50%) say the same.
- Majorities across all partisan affiliations consider US alliances with Asian countries to be beneficial. And half of Republicans and Independents and a majority of Democrats say the same about alliances in the Middle East.
- While support for US bases around the world has declined over the past year, these declines have taken place to a far greater degree among Republicans than among Democrats or Independents. For example, six in 10 Democrats (61%) and a narrow majority of Independents (52%) say the United States should have bases in NATO allies Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Republicans now say the United States should not have bases there (53%).
- Since Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Democrats have become more likely to support sending US troops to defend Baltic NATO-allied nations from Russia, while Republicans have become more divided. Two-thirds of Democrats (68%) support using US troops to help defend one of the Baltic NATO members, compared to 55 percent of Independents and 48 percent of Republicans.
- These declines are not just limited to issues concerning European allies. Public support for bases in Japan, South Korea, and Australia have also declined over the past year. And fewer now than a year ago are prepared to commit US troops to defend South Korea in the event of invasion by the North (50% favor, down from 63% in 2022).

# Drop in Support for US Assistance to Ukraine, Especially within GOP


Since the beginning of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the United States and its European allies have undertaken significant military and financial support programs to help Kyiv defend itself. As of December 2023, the United States alone had [contributed](#) roughly \$75 billion in humanitarian, financial, and military assistance. At the time the survey was conducted, roughly \$43 billion of that was in the form of military aid.

While the GOP's [congressional leadership](#) supports the provision of aid to Ukraine in exchange for tighter security along America's southern border, an outspoken minority of Republican leaders—including Trump—take a [more critical approach](#) to the Biden administration's continued assistance to Kyiv. These critics say the focus on Ukraine and Europe has caused the United States to neglect other important issues, particularly China.

This critique is in line with many everyday Republican views. Republicans among the US public also tend to think US leaders are giving too much attention to the Russia-Ukraine conflict (49%) along with climate change (58%) while not paying enough attention to the US-Mexico border (82%), US competition with China (60%), and Iran's nuclear program (56%).

## Figure A: Partisan Views on Global Threats Given Too Much Attention

*Do you think US leaders are giving each of the following issues too much attention, not enough attention, or about the right amount of attention?*




September 7 - 18, 2023 | n = 3,242  
CHICAGO COUNCIL SURVEYS

On the whole, a slim majority of the American public (53%) say the \$43 billion in military aid to Ukraine has been worth the cost while 45 percent say it has not. While Democrats are strongly convinced the assistance has been worth it (69%), Independents are closely divided (51% worth it, 47% not), and six in 10 Republicans (61%) believe it has not been worth the cost.

## Figure B: Value of US Military Support to Ukraine

The US has provided about \$43 billion in weapons, equipment and training to Ukraine since Russia invaded the country last year, which is about 4 percent of the \$1.77 trillion\* included in the Department of Defense annual budget. Do you think US military support has been: (%)



\*The \$1.77 trillion in this question refers to total Department of Defense obligations for the year, not the annual budget.

September 7 - 18, 2023 | n = 3,242


CHICAGO COUNCIL SURVEYS

Support for continuing that assistance—both in terms of economic and military aid—divides along similar lines. Overall, Americans support the provision of economic assistance to Ukraine (61%) and sending additional arms and military supplies to the Ukrainian government (63%), though at lower levels than they did in 2022. Republicans remain the least likely to support sending more financial (47%) and military aid (50%) to Ukraine, while Democrats and Independents remain supportive of both forms of aid but at lower levels than in previous years.



## Figure C: Support for Economic and Military Assistance to Ukraine

*In response to the situation involving Russia and Ukraine, would you support or oppose the United States: (% support)*




September 7 - 18, 2023 | n = 3,242  
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# Majority of Republicans Want US to Stay Out of World Affairs

In a time-tested barometer of support for US engagement in the world, almost six in 10 (57%) Americans continue to say that it would be best for the future of the country to take an active part in world affairs. Four in 10 (42%) say it would be best to stay out of world affairs. While still a majority, the 2023 result continues a steady decline in support for international engagement in recent years and is among one of the lowest levels of support recorded in the 49-year history of the Chicago Council Survey.

**Figure D: Partisanship and the US Role in the World**

*Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs? (% active part)*




September 7-18, 2023 | n = 3,242  
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While declines are evident across all partisan groups since 2020, the drop is sharpest among Republicans. The sharp decline among Republicans, coupled with a minor recovery among Democrats, has created the largest partisan gap recorded since this question was first asked in 1974. Until 2014, Republicans were the strongest advocates of an active US international role. Two years later, those positions changed, and they continue to diverge. In 2016, 70 percent of Democrats favored an active role in world affairs versus 64 percent of Republicans that said the same. In 2023, 70 percent of Democrats favor an active role, down from an all-time high of 78 percent in 2020, while just 47 percent of Republicans say the same. Moreover, for the first time, a slim majority (53%) of GOP supporters now say the United States should stay out of world affairs.

**Figure E: Republican Views on an Active Part in World Affairs**

*Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs? (%) [Among Republicans]*



September 7-18, 2023 | n = 778  
**CHICAGO COUNCIL SURVEYS**


# Majorities Still Consider US Alliance System to Be Beneficial

## Support for European Alliances Down

Much like views on the United States taking an active part in world affairs, Democratic and Republican attitudes have continued to diverge on the benefits of US security alliances in Europe. Self-described Democrats are most convinced that US security alliances in Europe are beneficial to both the United States and European allies or mostly benefit the United States (80%), up slightly from 2017 when three in four (75%) agreed. Two-thirds of Independents (63%) also view America's European alliances as beneficial, an increase from the 56 percent who said the same in 2017. By contrast, half of Republicans (50%) believe the United States benefits from its European alliances, down from 54 percent in 2017. When this question was first asked in 2017, there was a 21 percentage point gap between Democrats and Republicans. That gap now stands at 30 percentage points. (See Appendix Table 1)

Figure F: US Alliances in Europe

Which of the following comes closest to your view on US security alliances in Europe. Do they: (% mostly benefit the US + benefit both the US and our allies)



September 7-18, 2023 | n = 1,079  
CHICAGO COUNCIL SURVEYS


At the same time, however, US public support for NATO remains solid. About eight in 10 Americans (78%) say the United States should maintain or increase its commitment to NATO, consistent with high percentages of support in recent years. Democrats are at an all-time high of 92 percent on this question, but solid majorities of Republicans (68%) and Independents (73%) also continue to agree.

## Support for Alliances in East Asia Rising

In contrast to views of alliances in Europe, Republicans have grown *more* supportive of alliances with East Asian countries (59%, up from 50% in 2020), while Independents (54%) are slightly less likely now to say these alliances mostly benefit the United States or benefit both the United States and its allies (55%, down from 60% in 2020). Democrats have also become slightly more favorably inclined towards America’s East Asia alliances: seven in 10 (70%) say these alliances benefit both the United States and allies or mostly benefit the United States, up from 64 percent in 2019. (See Appendix Table 2)

**Figure G: US Alliances in East Asia**

*Which of the following comes closest to your view on US security alliances in East Asia. Do they: (% mostly benefit the US + benefit both the US and our allies)*




September 7-18, 2023 | n = 1,090  
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One reason the public might see more value in US-East Asia alliances: a rising sense that the development of China as a world power represents a threat to the vital interest of the United States. Today, 58 percent of Americans see China’s rise as a critical threat to the United States, the highest level recorded in Chicago Council Surveys since the question was first asked in 1990. This is also the first time since 2002 that a bipartisan majority of Republicans (71%), Democrats (52%), and Independents (53%) all share the same assessment of China’s rise.

**Figure H: Threat of China’s Development as a World Power**

*Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all: The development of China as a world power (% critical threat)*



September 7-18, 2023 | n = 2,064  
**CHICAGO COUNCIL SURVEYS**

Americans have a fairly broad range of concerns about China. When asked to choose the area of greatest concern regarding China, Americans divide almost evenly across different issue areas presented. Similar proportions of Americans point to China’s economic power (23%), its communist political system (22%), its human rights policies (21%), and its military power (20%); an additional 12 percent say that none of the above are their main concern. (See Appendix Figure 1)


## Mixed Views on Mideast Alliances, Even before October 7

Attitudes on alliances in the Middle East are more difficult to discern using the 2023 data given that the survey was conducted before the October 7 Hamas attacks on Israel and resulting war in Gaza, which may have significantly shifted public attitudes.

At the time of the survey, a narrow majority of Americans said these alliances are beneficial to either the United States or the United States and its allies (54%), down from 2019 (59%) and 2020 (61%). Republican support has dropped significantly from 2020 (48% down from 60%), as has support among Independents (50% vs. 63%). By contrast, 64 percent of Democrats perceived benefits for the United States, an all-time high. (See Appendix Table 3)

**Figure I: US Alliances in the Middle East**

*Which of the following comes closest to your view on US security alliances in the Middle East. Do they: (% mostly benefit the US + benefit both the US and our allies)*




September 7-18, 2023 | n = 1,073  
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Before Hamas [launched its attack](#) on Israel and the Israeli government declared a state of war, the September 7-18 Chicago Council survey showed that Americans value the US security partnership with Israel and tend to see Israel as an ally or partner to the United States. Two in three Americans (and majorities across political affiliations) thought the US-Israeli security relationship does more to strengthen (64%) than weaken (32%) US national security. This put Israel on par with other US partners and allies such as Taiwan (65%), Mexico (62%) and Ukraine (60%), and ahead of Saudi Arabia (45%).

Yet Americans overall wanted the United States to stay impartial on the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, as they have in past surveys. Nearly two-thirds (64%) thought the United States should not take either side in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, up slightly from 2021 (58%). While solid majorities of Democrats (74%) and Independents (67%) wanted the United States to stay impartial, Republicans were equally likely to say the United States should side with Israel (49%) as say neither side (48%).

### Figure J: Side in Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

*In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, do you think the United States should take Israel's side, the Palestinians' side, or not take either side? (%)*



September 7 - 18, 2023 | n = 3,242  
**CHICAGO COUNCIL SURVEYS**



Most Americans said the current political situation between Israel and the Palestinian people is not an acceptable solution. When asked about each potential solution—the status quo, a two-state solution or a one state-solution—only one-third (33%) said the status quo is acceptable, up slightly from 2021 (when 26% found this acceptable).


Six in 10 (60%) thought a two-state solution with the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip would be acceptable. Six in 10 also said a one-state solution incorporating both Israeli and Palestinian territories in which Israelis and Palestinians are treated as equal citizens would be acceptable (61%). On each of these two options, Democrats were more positive than Republicans or Independents, though at least half of each group said one or two states were acceptable solutions. Minorities across party affiliations found the status quo acceptable (41% Republicans, 28% Democrat, 31% Independent). (See Appendix Figure 2)

## **Majorities Support US Military Bases Abroad, but Differential Partisan Declines in Support**

In general, US bases abroad receive bipartisan support among the public. As the 2023 survey reveals, similar majorities of Americans across party lines favor US bases in South Korea, Japan, and Poland, with majorities of Republicans, Democrats, and Independents in agreement. Bases in Turkey and Australia, however, divide all three partisan groups. (See Appendix Table 4)

## Figure K: Support for US Military Bases Abroad

Do you think the United States should or should not have long-term military bases in the following places? (% should have)




September 7-18, 2023 | n=1,623

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The similar level of support for US bases across partisan groups is a departure from the norm. Historically, Republicans have tended to be more supportive of US bases abroad than Independents or Democrats. That is no longer the case. While support for US bases around the world has declined over the past year, these declines have taken place to a far greater degree among Republicans than among Democrats or Independents, with support for bases in Germany the sole exception. In Asia, Republican support fell for bases in Japan (65%, down from 72% in 2022), South Korea (63%, from 77%), and Australia (52%, down from 64%). And in Europe, there have been even greater declines in Republican support for bases in Poland (53%, down from 68%), Turkey (48%, down from 65%), and in US NATO Baltic allies like Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia (45%, down from 67%).

**Figure L: Republican Support for US Bases: 2022 vs. 2023**

*Do you think the United States should or should not have long-term military bases in the following places? (% should have)*



September 7 - 18, 2023 | n = 430  
**CHICAGO COUNCIL SURVEYS**


# Growing Partisan Divisions on Defending Allies in Europe, Asia

The 2023 survey highlights growing partisan divisions on the use of force to protect allies. Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Democrats have become more likely to support sending US troops to defend Baltic NATO-allied nations from Russia, while Republicans have shifted to opposing US intervention. Overall majorities continue to support using US troops if Russia invades a NATO ally like Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia (57%, compared to 56% in 2022), or Germany (64%, new question in this survey). Broken down by political affiliation, about two-thirds of Democrats (68%) support using US troops to help defend one of the Baltic NATO members, compared to 55 percent of Independents and 48 percent of Republicans.

This partisan division on coming to the defense of Baltic allies is another new development. In the 2021 Chicago Council Survey, majorities of both Democrats (63%) and Republicans (57%) favored coming to the defense of America’s NATO allies in the Baltics. Since the outbreak of the war, Democrats have become more likely to support sending US troops to defend Baltic NATO-allied nations from Russia, while Republicans have shifted to opposing US intervention.

**Figure M: US Defense of NATO Baltic Allies**

*There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using US troops in other parts of the world. Please give your opinion about some situations. Would you favor or oppose the use of US troops: If Russia invades a NATO ally like Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia (% favor)*



September 7-18, 2023 | n = 1,624  
CHICAGO COUNCIL SURVEYS

# Conclusion

The decline in support for international involvement among everyday Republicans likely reflects debates within the GOP leadership itself, which has become increasingly divided over the value of American financial commitments overseas, including continued assistance to Ukraine. The survey data further show GOP questions about the value of continuing contributions to Kyiv—and Democratic unity on the issue—are likely influencing other traditional areas of foreign policy, which have been consistently bipartisan in past surveys. While Republicans have grown more skeptical about using US troops to defend allies in Europe, Democrats have become more supportive of doing so. These partisan divisions may continue and potentially grow as the war in Ukraine—and the US debate over support to Kyiv—continue.


But the data also show Republicans who want to stay out of world affairs do not differ so much from those who prefer active engagement when it comes to issues such as the [rise of China](#) or [immigration policy](#). Thus far, the effects of the debate over US involvement in the war in Ukraine seem to focus on differences on what priorities are most important for the United States to pursue in its foreign policy, the value of maintaining a US global military presence, and the use of US troops to defend allies in scenarios not involving top concerns for Republicans.

# Appendix

Figure 1

## Americans' Concerns about China

*What, if anything, are you most concerned about when it comes to China? (%)*




September 7-18, 2023 | n=3,242  
CHICAGO COUNCIL SURVEYS

Figure 2

## Acceptable Solutions to Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

*In your opinion, would you say the following are acceptable or unacceptable solutions to the ongoing conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians? (% acceptable)*



September 7 - 18, 2023 | n = 3,242

**CHICAGO COUNCIL SURVEYS**

Table 1

*Which of the following comes closest to your view on US security alliances in Europe.  
Do they:*

Mostly benefit the US (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2017	9	7	11	8	-4
2019	6	7	8	4	-1
January 2020	18	13	24	16	-11
2020	7	4	10	7	-6
2023	7	6	9	6	-3
Mostly benefit our allies (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2017	26	36	14	31	22
2019	24	32	12	30	20
January 2020	20	29	10	24	19
2020	21	41	7	20	34
2023	24	35	12	25	24
Benefit both (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2017	53	48	64	47	-16
2019	58	54	68	53	-14
January 2020	52	53	56	49	-3
2020	61	50	71	59	-21
2023	57	43	71	57	-28
Benefit neither (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2017	9	6	9	11	-3
2019	9	5	10	13	-5
January 2020	6	3	6	8	-3
2020	8	2	8	12	-6
2023	10	13	6	10	7



Table 2

*Which of the following comes closest to your view on US security alliances in East Asia. Do they:*

Mostly benefit the US (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2017	9	4	11	9	-7
2019	7	6	6	9	0
January 2020	13	10	16	11	-6
2020	7	3	9	8	-6
2023	9	6	9	10	-3
Mostly benefit our allies (%)					
2017	21	33	15	18	18
2019	21	25	16	23	9
January 2020	22	26	18	22	8
2020	17	26	9	20	17
2023	21	25	14	23	11
Benefit both the US and our allies (%)					
2017	51	47	55	51	-8
2019	53	50	58	51	-8
January 2020	48	49	50	46	-1
2020	52	47	59	52	-12
2023	52	53	61	45	-8
Benefit neither (%)					
2017	15	10	16	17	-6
2019	15	15	16	14	-1
January 2020	4	13	12	17	1
2020	17	17	18	17	-1
2023	15	10	13	20	-3

Table 3

*Which of the following comes closest to your view on US security alliances in Middle East Do they:*

Mostly benefit the US (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2017	6	6	5	8	1
2019	9	9	7	11	2
January 2020	15	10	18	15	-8
2020	11	9	13	11	-4
2023	10	6	13	8	-7
Mostly benefit our allies (%)					
2017	24	32	22	20	10
2019	22	25	20	22	5
January 2020	21	26	17	21	9
2020	18	21	18	16	3
2023	24	30	17	25	13
Benefit both the US and our allies (%)					
2017	42	44	45	38	-1
2019	50	51	55	45	-4
January 2020	39	40	39	39	1
2020	49	51	46	52	5
2023	44	42	51	42	-9
Benefit neither (%)					
2017	24	15	25	30	-10
2019	18	14	17	21	-3
January 2020	22	23	23	21	0
2020	16	11	20	16	-9
2023	19	19	16	22	3

Table 4

*Do you think the United States should or should not have long-term military bases in the following places?*

Japan (% should have)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2002	63	67	60	63	7
2004	52	56	52	50	4
2006	57	66	52	57	14
2008	58	67	50	57	17
2010	49	56	46	47	10
2012	51	57	49	51	8
2014	55	59	50	56	9
2016	60	69	57	56	12
2018	65	72	65	61	7
2021 Trilateral	59	65	54	59	11
2022	67	72	64	66	8
2023	63	65	62	62	3

South Korea (% should have)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2002	67	74	66	64	8
2004	62	71	62	56	9
2006	62	73	57	61	16
2008	63	72	59	59	13
2010	60	68	58	58	10
2012	60	68	57	58	11
2014	64	70	61	64	9
2016	70	76	70	64	6
2018	74	79	73	71	6
January 2020	69	80	65	65	15
2021 Trilateral	66	70	65	65	5
2022	72	77	72	69	5
2023	64	63	66	62	-3

Germany (% should have)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2002	69	73	66	68	8
2004	57	62	44	53	8
2006	57	64	42	54	12
2008	59	64	44	53	10
2010	50	59	46	48	13
2012	51	54	50	51	4
2014	57	62	53	57	9
2016	61	70	58	56	12
2018	60	66	60	57	6
2022	68	71	68	66	3
2023	61	67	63	55	4

Turkey (% should have)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2002	58	64	55	57	9
2004	46	56	44	42	12
2006	46	51	42	48	9
2008	49	56	44	48	12
2010	42	49	40	40	9
2012	40	45	39	38	6
2014	43	47	40	43	7
2018	53	59	51	50	8
2022	56	65	55	51	10
2023	50	48	51	50	-3

Australia (% should have)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2012	40	44	38	39	6
2014	42	44	38	43	6
2016	46	53	42	45	11
2021 Trilateral	54	56	49	56	7
2022	56	64	51	55	13
2023	49	52	49	48	3

Poland (% should have)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2014	37	39	32	39	0
2018	47	55	44	46	0
2022	62	68	59	61	9
2023	54	53	54	54	-1

NATO allies like Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia (% should have)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2022	65	67	67	61	0
2023	53	45	61	52	-16

# Methodology

The 2023 Chicago Council Survey, a project of the Lester Crown Center on US Foreign Policy, is the latest effort in a series of wide-ranging surveys on American attitudes toward US foreign policy. The 2023 Chicago Council Survey is made possible by the generous support of the support of the Crown family, the Korea Foundation, and the United States – Japan Foundation.

The survey was conducted from September 7 to 18, 2023, among a representative national sample of 3,242 adults. The margin of sampling error for the full sample is +/- 2.0 percentage points, including a design effect of 1.2908. The margin of error is higher for partisan subgroups or for partial-sample items. Partisan identification is based on respondents' answer to a standard partisan self-identification question: "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or what?"

The 2023 survey sample is composed of a main sample (n=2,184) and several augment samples which allow for more detailed demographic analysis: a Hispanic augment sample (n=305), an African American/Black American augment sample (n=281), an American Indian/Alaskan Native augment sample (n=123), a Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander augment (n=129, and an Asian augment sample (n=330). The results are weighted to account for these oversampled populations; see 'Sampling and Weighting' for more details.

The survey was conducted in English and Spanish by Ipsos Public Affairs, a polling, social science, and market research firm in Palo Alto, California using a randomly selected sample of Ipsos' large-scale nationwide research panel, KnowledgePanel® (KP). KnowledgePanel is the first and largest online research panel that is representative of the entire U.S. population. Ipsos recruits panel members using address-based sampling (ABS) methods to ensure full coverage of all households in the nation.

The survey was fielded to a total of 5,838 panel members yielding a total of 3,399 completed surveys (a completion rate of 58.2%). The median survey length was 25 minutes. Of the 3,399 total completed surveys, 157 cases were excluded for quality control reasons, leaving a final sample size of 3,242 respondents.

Cases were excluded if they failed one of the following three criteria:

**1. Speedsters:** Respondents who completed the survey in 8 minutes or less.

- Total cases removed: n=67

**2. Refused 50% or more of questions:** Respondents who refused to answer 50% or more of the eligible survey questions.

- Total cases removed: n=100; n=83 unique to criteria group

**3. Data Check Score of 3 of 4:** Respondents who failed 3 or 4 of the quality checks implemented (see criteria below).

- Total cases removed: n=24; n=7 unique to criteria group

1. Completed survey faster than 8 minutes.
2. Did not accurately input a “4”, refused or skipped Question Q3\_1 in the survey, which was designed to make sure respondents were paying attention to the survey. (“In order to make sure that your browser is working correctly, please select number 4 from the below list.”).
3. Refused one or more full battery of 5 attributes or more (Q12, Q5, Q5A1974, Q30, Q451S, Q40, Q44, Q131, Q140, Q50, Q175, Q250, Q296, QTW2, Q354, Q190CHN, Q358J, Q358K, Q819, Q402).
4. Respondents who straight lined their responses to a battery of grid questions (Q12, Q44, Q190CHN, Q354, Q358J, Q358K).

For more information about the Chicago Council Survey, please contact Dina Smeltz, Senior Fellow, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy ([dsmeltz@thechicagocouncil.org](mailto:dsmeltz@thechicagocouncil.org)) or Craig Kafura, Assistant Director, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy ([ckafura@thechicagocouncil.org](mailto:ckafura@thechicagocouncil.org)).

## Sampling and Weighting

In general, the specific survey samples represent an equal probability selection method (EPSEM) sample from the panel for general population surveys. The raw distribution of KP mirrors that of the US adults fairly closely, barring occasional disparities that may emerge for certain subgroups due to differential attrition. To ensure selection of general population samples from KP behave as EPSEM, additional measures are undertaken, starting by weighting the pool of active members to the geodemographic benchmarks secured from a combination of the U.S. Census Bureau's American Community Survey (ACS) and the latest March supplement of the U.S. Census Bureau's Current Population Survey (CPS) along several dimensions. Using the resulting weights as measure of size, a PPS (probability proportional to size) procedure is used to select study specific samples. It is the application of this PPS methodology with the imposed size measures that produces demographically balanced and representative samples that behave as EPSEM. Moreover, in instances where a study design requires any form of oversampling of certain subgroups, such departures from an EPSEM design are accounted for by adjusting the design weights in reference to the Census benchmarks for the population of interest.

For this study, the following benchmark distributions of U.S. adults age 18 and over from the March 2023 Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplement Data (with language proficiency coming from the 2021 American Community Survey (ACS) data) were used for the raking adjustment of weights:

- Gender (Male, Female) by Age (18-29, 30-44, 45-59, 60+) by Race/Ethnicity (African American, American Indian/Alaskan Native, Asian/Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, Hispanic, All Other Races). Age was collapsed (18-59) for the American Indian/Alaskan Native Sample
- Race/Ethnicity (White, African American, Asian, American Indian/Alaskan Native, Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, Hispanic, All Other Races)
- Census Region (Northeast, Midwest, South, West) by Metropolitan Status (Metro, Non-Metro) by Race/Ethnicity (African American, American Indian/Alaskan Native, Asian/Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, Hispanic, All Other Races). Census Region was collapsed (Northeast, Midwest) for the American Indian/Alaskan Native Sample



- Education (Less than High School, High School, Some College, Bachelor or higher) by Race/Ethnicity (African American, American Indian/Alaskan Native, Asian/Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, Hispanic, All Other Races). Education was collapsed (Less than High School, High School, Some College) for the American Indian/Alaskan Native Sample and the Asian/Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander Sample, separately
- Household Income (under \$25K, \$25-\$49,999, \$50K-\$74,999, \$75K-\$99,999, \$100K-\$149,999, \$150K and over) by Race/Ethnicity (African American, American Indian/Alaskan Native, Asian/Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, Hispanic, All Other Races). Household Income was collapsed (\$75K or more) for the American Indian/Alaskan Native Sample
- Language Proficiency (English Proficient, Bilingual, Spanish Proficient, Non-Hispanic)
- Hispanic Origin (Non-Hispanic, Mexican/Mexican-American/Chicano, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Cuban-American, Other Spanish/Hispanic/Latino)

Once the study sample has been selected and the survey administered, and all the survey data are edited and made final, design weights are adjusted to account for any differential nonresponse that may have resulted during the field period. Depending on the specific target population for a given study, geodemographic distributions for the corresponding population are obtained from the CPS, the American Community Survey (ACS), or in certain instances from the weighted KP profile data. For this purpose, an iterative proportional fitting (raking) procedure is used to produce the final weights. In the final step, calculated weights are examined to identify and, if necessary, trim outliers at the extreme upper and lower tails of the weight distribution. The resulting weights are then scaled to aggregate to the total sample size of all eligible respondents.

Because the 2023 Chicago Council Survey contained several race/ethnicity oversample groups, two weights were created using the aforementioned process (*weight* and *race\_wt*). The *weight* weights were scaled to match the total study sample size (n=3,242). The *race\_wt* weights were scaled to match the individual Race/Ethnicity Samples (African American, American Indian/Alaskan Native, Asian/Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, Hispanic, All Other Races). Results are reported by as weighted by *weight* in this report; future reports focusing on results by race/ethnicity would use *race\_wt*.

## About the Survey Sample

	Republican	Democrat	Independent
% of 2023 sample (n=3,242)	27	32	39
Average age	51	48	47
Racial composition (%)			
White, non-Hispanic	80	46	62
Black, non-Hispanic	2	21	12
Hispanic	11	22	18
Other, non-Hispanic	7	11	8
Gender (%)			
Female	51	56	47
Male	49	44	53
Education (%)			
High school or less	41	34	39
Some college/associate's degree	29	24	27
College graduates	30	42	34
Ideology (%)			
Conservative	76	8	25
Moderate	19	32	53
Liberal	4	60	21
Age (%)			
18-29	16	21	21
30-44	22	25	29
45-59	26	23	22
60+	36	31	27

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